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 Container Throughput and Economic Development 
 
South East Asia has experienced rapid economic growth during recent decades, and 
export contributed a great deal to the region‟s economic development. According to 
UNCTAD Maritime Transport, the total fleet in South East Asia has increased from 
58,280 vessels in 2002 to 150,337 in 2014. Among all vessels, the number of 
container ships increased from 5,630 in 2002 to 22,069 in 2014. Located next to the 
two world‟s biggest growth engines– China and India, countries of South East Asia 
have not lost out in the battle during this round either. It is safe to say that one of the 
highest GDP rates in the world can be found in South East Asia. Our analysis 
illustrates the main economic indicators of Cambodia, Indonesia and Malaysia from 
which readers could catch a sight of the market trend and thus get some insights for 
the port development and growth in container throughput.  
 
Figure 1. Container Throughput of Ports in South East Asia During 2002 to 2012 
   Sources:  UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2005-2013 
       World Bank Container Port Traffic 
 
With the economic development, ports of this region have undergone some 
transformation and development as well, although there are some ports lagging 
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behind. Figure 1 illustrates container throughput of major ports in Southeast Asia. 
Some ports in Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Cambodia are obviously growing 
more slowly, and we will describe the key advantages and challenges that face them. 
According to Figure 1, Singapore and Malaysia are performing far better than the 
other ports. Factors that contribute to remarkable growth in container throughput 
should be categorized in several aspects, both in terms of “software” and “hardware”.  
 
1. Cambodia 
 
Among the seaports in Cambodia, Sihanoukville Port is the major port that deals 
with international containers. The Port of Sihanoukville is situated in Sihanoukville 
province, and is the principal and only deep seaport of Cambodia. Transportation 
traffic is estimated at around 2.4 million tonnes per year. Phnom Penh Port is the 
other major port in Cambodia that is used for import and export. Penh Port handles 
around 25% of the nation‟s container throughput each year due to its advantageous 
geographic position. Penh Port is connected with sea lanes to China via the Mekong 
River.  
 
Figure 2. Main economic indicators of Cambodia, 2002-2012 
     Sources: UNCTAD STAT, http://unctadstat.unctad.org 
 
As is indicated in Figure 2, Cambodia was hit hard by the world economic recession 
in 2008-2009. However, the port‟s business in Cambodia has seen strong economic 
growth by bouncing back and continuing to grow after year 2009. Cambodia‟s 
economy relies heavily on its agricultural products rather than industries. Rice, 
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wheat and bean are major contributors to export. During the years 2009 to 2012, rice 
handling volume at Sihanoukville Port and Penh Port increased by more than 10 
times. 
 
2. Indonesia 
 
As can be seen from Figure 3, the Indonesian economy has been growing increasingly 
strong over the past decade. The truth is that along with its economy development, 
Indonesia‟s trade policies and trade environment have been rather progressively 
opened. With headquarter of UNESCAP located in the capital city, Jakarta, many 
kinds of resources, and professionals having experiences and wisdom working, the 
region‟s economy has steadily improved. Evidence is shown in Figure 3 that there is a 
sharp increase of Foreign Direct Invest in Indonesia during recent years, too.  
 
Figure 3. Main economic indicators of Indonesia, 2002-2012 
     Sources: UNCTAD STAT, http://unctadstat.unctad.org  
 
Indonesia has two principal ports, Tanjung Priok Port and Tanjun Perak Port, the 
former handling two-thirds of Indonesia‟s international trade and container traffic. 
To be consistent with the economic development, Indonesia has to go through 
infrastructure capacity-building, which is the key to sustainable port progress. 
According to Indonesia Port Corporation, the container traffic in Tanjun Priok port 
will grow more than 160 percent by 2015. The long dwell time and sophisticated 
payment system are the current bottle necks at both ports. Endeavors to shorten 
dwell time and simplify payment and customer clearance procedures are necessary. 
The government has signaled very positively that it plans to develop 
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international-standard ports. 
 
3. Malaysia 
 
Port Kelang and Port of Tanjung Pelepas are two major ports in Malaysia. Port 
Kelang is one of the most established ports in Malaysia. The port has trade 
connections with over 120 countries, and more than 500 ports around the world. It 
also serves as the nation‟s load centre and regional transshipment centre, and is 
called upon by 17,000 vessels annually. Port Kelang has been developed in line with 
the economic growth of the country, and it has been positioned as a regional 
transshipment hub. Compared with the ports of the two previously mentioned 
countries, port efficiency in Malaysia greatly benefits due to its modern 
infrastructure, information systems, professionals, customs clearance efficiency and 
advanced management skills especially in logistics and maritime industries. Apart 
from those advantages, policies and regulations drive global supply chain forward so 
as to fully support international trade to the largest extent. According to Figure 4, 
Malaysia has expanded its economy and Foreign Direct Investment rapid over the 
last five years. Except for the economic downturn during the financial crisis, GDP in 
Malaysia has demonstrated strong upward trend, and it seems like the trend is 
ongoing.  
 
Figure 4. Main economic indicators of Malaysia, 2002-2012 
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 CHINA REJECTS P3 ALLIANCE 
 
In 2013, Maersk Line, CMA CGM and MSC agreed to establish an operation pact 
named the P3 Network so as to solve industry overcapacity issues. The Network was 
later approved by the regulators in EU and the U.S. in 2014. After EU and the U.S. 
have cleared the alliance, the P3 Network has only been waiting for China to approve 
it in June, 2014. However, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 
announced that it has decided not to approve the planned large-scale alliance 
between the three largest carriers in the world, Maersk Line, CMA CGM, and MSC. 
The decision was made and P3 will not be realized. 
  
According to Maersk, the decision follows a review under China‟s merger control 
rules. “The Partners respect MOFCOM‟s decision. Subsequently, the Partners have 
agreed to stop the preparatory work on the P3 Network and the P3 Network as 
initially planned will not come into existence. The lack of implementation of the P3 
Network will have no material impact on the Maersk Group‟s expected results for 
2014.” 
 
According to MOFCOM, formation of a global alliance might have benefited Maersk, 
MSC and CMA CGM at the expense of other operators, and that in “numerous 
discussions” the P3 Network had failed to address whether the positive elements 
would outweigh any adverse impact. The P3 Network was considered a merger, 
which differs from the opinion that authorities of the alliance hold. China‟s decision 
to reject the formation of a global alliance, however, did come as a surprise to the 
partners as they had worked hard with regulators from China side to address all the 
regulator‟s concerns said Group CEO Nils Smedegaard.  
 
Maersk Line had been thrilled about the strategic benefits that P3 alliance would 
have offered, such as expanding vessel networks, enabling them to make further 
reductions in cost and carbon emissions, improving its customer services, and 
improving margins in the end. Nevertheless, it is said that the absence of P3 alliance 
would not make much difference to Maersk‟s target earnings in 2014, basing on the 
performance of the previous several quarters where there was an absence of P3. 
Moreover, Maersk Line has proved to be able to achieve many accomplishments 
alone in terms of reduction in cost and carbon emissions and making profits during 
downturn periods. Maersk Line would continue in this way, declared Maersk Line‟s 
Trade and Marketing Offier Vincent Clerc, though he was also surprised by the 
decision from regulators of China.   
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STRENGTHENING HONG KONG’S 
LEADING POSITION AS A LOGISTICS 
HUB 
AN EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR CHUNG-YEE LEE 
 
BY EDITORS OF THE MARITIME INSIGHT 
VENUE: THE HONG KONG POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY 
 
 
We recently had the privilege to meet Prof. Chung-Yee Lee in order to solicit his 
views on how to transform Hong Kong‟s Ocean Transport Logistics Network so as to 
strengthen Hong Kong‟s leading position as a logistics hub. Prof. Lee also shared his 
personal experiences and thoughts on how to conduct quality research.   
  
Q1: What direction to date has your research taken in finding solutions to 
transform Hong Kong’s Ocean Container Transport Logistics Network? 
Are there any policy implications that have come from your research 
findings for the Hong Kong Government on how to strengthen Hong 
Kong’s leading position as a logistics hub which is currently perceived to 
be under serious threat from neighboring port cities? 
 
Prof. Chung-Yee Lee: Presently, there are two active models of what we term and 
understand as a maritime centre. The first one is the London/New York model which 
has been transferred from a centre focusing on actual physical cargo flows to one that 
currently deals with financial and service flows. Conversely, the other representation 
is termed the Rotterdam model which is mostly concerned with the physical flow of 
cargo. However, Hong Kong has to determine its future in a way which is 
Prof. Chung-Yee Lee is Chair Professor/Cheong Ying Chan 
Professor of Engineering, Department of Industrial Engineering & 
Logistics Management (IELM) and Director of the Logistics and 
Supply Chain Management Institute at The Hong Kong University 
of Science and Technology. He served as Department Head of 
IELM in 2001-2008. He is a Fellow of the Institute of Industrial 
Engineers and Hong Kong Academy of Engineering Science. 
Before joining HKUST in 2001, he was Rockwell Professor in the 
Department of Industrial Engineering at Texas A&M University. 
His research areas are in logistics and supply chain management, 
scheduling, and inventory management. He has published more 
than 130 papers in refereed journals and has engaged in more 
than 40 research projects sponsored by RGC, ITC, NSF and 
industries in U.S. and Hong Kong.  
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significantly different from those two models. The London/New York model and the 
Rotterdam model are operated within one country and one system, while Hong Kong 
is in a unique position of being administered under the umbrella policy known as 
“One country, two systems”. This situation presents a variety of challenges thus 
making it harder for Hong Kong to simply adopt the London/New York model.  
 
In my opinion, Hong Kong could visualize its future as developing into an 
international maritime centre with mixed functions of both the London/New York 
model and the Rotterdam model. On the one hand, Hong Kong continues to play its 
physical advantage, which is a foundation to promote both service and financial flow. 
That is to say, the real advantages of Hong Kong provide a solid foundation for its 
soft power so that it can supply both functions and therefore, in the long term, 
ensure a high degree of prosperity. On the other hand, Hong Kong has to further 
improve its competence in the area of service flows. In the future, one possibility 
could be that Hong Kong collaborates with Shenzhen to establish the world‟s largest 
logistics zone. A very important aspect to strengthen Hong Kong‟s leading position as 
a logistics hub is that leading academics continuously focus effort and research into 
this area in order to present clear and viable options and solutions to the Hong Kong 
government. In this way, effective policies can be implemented particularly with 
regard to the global supply chain.   
 
With regards to the whole supply chain, efficiency as well as predictability is of equal 
importance. I believe that one reason why neighboring port cities in China are unable 
to match Hong Kong in a short time frame is due to these two characteristics. Overall 
supply chain costs might be higher in Hong Kong, but since it is predictable and 
highly efficient, customers would still be willing to buy into its services. Apart from 
logistics efficiency, transshipment in Hong Kong is more predictable both in terms of 
time and cost. From a customer‟s perspective, predictability in time and cost 
currently make Hong Kong a more reliable business partner and destination. 
 
Q2: Except for the star ports like Shanghai, Singapore, Hong Kong, and 
Shenzhen, do ports in Vietnam, India and Indonesia have a future? 
 
Prof. Chung-Yee Lee: Yes, they certainly have a future in terms of growth and 
influence in the region but this will greatly depend on whether they can improve in 
both their efficiency and effectiveness. Most academic research aims to improve 
efficiency yet effectiveness usually is strongly affected by government regulation and 
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policy. India has recently been showing great improvements in the high-tech sector, 
particularly the software industry.  With greater expectations by the middle classes 
and a corresponding increase in living standards, this will automatically lead to 
greater demands on the logistics industry and India will need to expand its ports. For 
the time being, I should say that India is not quite ready yet for huge expansion of its 
port operations. 
 
Q3: Could you please share any of your ideas about the application of 
your research with the professions from the shipping and logistics 
industries?  
 
Prof. Chung-Yee Lee: We are actually in preliminary stage where building the 
inventory is our priority task. Several pilot projects are being conducted in 
collaboration with the ocean industry, for example, OOCL and HIT. We hope that the 
experiences obtained from these implementations could be further scalable and 
widely applicable in other companies of shipping and logistics industries as well.  
 
Q4: Could you please share research experiences with the academia 
about how to conduct quality research and publish papers in top 
journals? 
 
Prof. Chung-Yee Lee: Achieving global excellence and making great local impact 
are usually the twin goals in my research. To achieve these, we have to improve a 
number of skills including communication, problem solving and IT as well as have a 
thorough understanding of the latest trends in both business and industry knowledge. 
To make great local impact we have to work closely with industries to solve practical 
problems and also incorporate what we learned from practice into interesting, 
relevant and practical class materials. My advice to junior faculty would be that in 
addition to devoting most of your time (say 80%) to your duties in terms of teaching, 
research and publishing under your institute‟s specific requirement, I would also 
strongly encourage them to make full use of the rest of their time (say 20%) and work 
extra hard to do what they want to do to really make a difference. I believe that this is 
the only way to achieve self-improvement and reengineer your career.   
 
Q5: It’s important for shipping companies to improve their cost 
efficiency particularly when facing the problem of overcapacity. Would 
you like to share the research outputs related to this problem 
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(methodology, results, conclusion and management insight, etc.) with 
the readers of Maritime Insight?  
 
Prof. Chung-Yee Lee: We are conducting pilot research in finding solutions to the 
problem of overcapacity. In particular, we are currently focusing on the issue of 
empty container repositioning which is trying to figure out coordination mechanisms 
to counter this matter. This research is still ongoing as it is a challenging and 
complex area; however, we are confident of practical solutions.   
 
With regards to the problem of overcapacity, we have conducted another pilot 
research project which is concerned with the impact of slow steaming of ocean 
container transport on global supply chains, and we have already presented research 
results to our collaborators and sponsor companies. Slow steaming has always been a 
controversial issue that affects the entire supply chain, and is currently implemented 
by the main liner shipping companies. Our research findings lead to a simple and 
implementable policy with a controlled cost and guaranteed delivery reliability. 
Firstly, we found out that, ideally and theoretically, vessels which adapt slow 
steaming would save more than 10% of energy. Energy saving means cost saving, so 
even 1% of saving in energy would help decrease the vessel‟s operating costs sharply 
because today fuel costs account for up to 60% of a vessel‟s operating cost.  
 
Additionally, based on port congestion and other historical data necessary for 
identifying a pattern of a vessel‟s randomness, we also found out that reliability and 
predictability increases as a result of a flexible slow steaming strategy. Shippers care 
most about the “predictability” of the deliveries, and our findings did show that the 
variance of the delivery time under the flexible slow steaming strategy is always 
smaller than that under the fast steaming strategy. This ensures more accurate 
deliveries.  
 
Moreover, by applying slow steaming, vessels have the flexibility to speed up and the 
speed can be adjusted anywhere in the interval so as to combat the randomness of 
port times, leading to an improvement in service quality as well.  
 
For detailed information about the impact of slow steaming of ocean container transport on global 
supply chains, please refer to Prof. Chung-Yee Lee’s research paper titled “The Impact of Slow Ocean 
Steaming on Delivery Reliability and Fuel Consumption” published in 2013.
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A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO  
THE CRUISE SAFETY ISSUES 
The case of the ferry accident in S. Korea 
 
  Photography by Prof. Chin-Shan Lu, 2014 
 
s economic growth is making it more affordable for people to travel by cruise 
ship, taking a cruise holiday is becoming increasingly popular among 
passengers all over the world. According to the Cruise Lines International 
Association, 20 million-plus global passengers went on a cruise vacation in 2012. 
With more than 20 million passengers taking cruise holidays each year, the safety 
and security of passengers and crew is highly regarded by the cruise community, the 
industry and relevant organizations. Cruises have proved to be a very safe method of 
taking a vacation (Cartwright & Baird, 1999). Over the past decades, scientific and 
technology advances have made ship design safe, innovative, enjoyable, and 
comfortable for passengers. The International Maritime Organization also mandates 
global standards for the safety and operation of cruise ships. The cruise industry and 
community have adhered to strict regulations which ensure safety and security of the 
crew and passengers. Apart from the international regulations specifically designed 
to meet requirements of safety of passengers and crew, a unique organization, the 
U.S. Coast Guard, has partnered with the Cruise Lines International Association and 
conducted safety inspections for every cruise ship that embarks passengers in a U.S. 
Port.  
A 
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A review of the cruise accident in S. Korea   
 
n April 17, 2014, a huge ferry named SEWOL carrying 476 passengers and 
150 vehicles sunk off the coast of South Korea with hundreds of high school 
students on board. The captain was one of the first one to leave abandoning 
many passengers to sink together with the vessel. It took two and a half hours for the 
ferry to submerge in waters, and before that no any crew members had assisted or 
even notified passengers to escape from their quarters, nor did the captain and ship‟s 
crew use the abandon ship drill to notify passengers before they themselves run away, 
only leaving passengers to sink with the vessel. From the day the accident happened 
till June 10, 292 victims and only 172 survivors were declared and 12 passengers are 
still missing. Nearly all the survivors were those who did not follow the Captain‟s 
orders and rushed to the deck of the ship. A brief profile of the SEWOL Ferry is 
presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Profile of the SEWOL Ferry 
Profile of the SEWOL Ferry 
Previous name Ferry Naminoue  
Birth place  Japan 
Vessel age ≥ 20 years 
Vessel type Car Ferry, one kind of Ro-Ro ships 
Owner Chonghaejin Marine Co. 
Modification Added many cabins which were built on the top floor of the 
ship, increasing passenger capacity and overloading the 
cargo   
Operation information Operated in Japan from 1994 to 2012 
 
Attention has also been switched not only to cruise safety but also to the reasons that 
caused the accident of a huge and modern ship in South Korea. News reporters, 
commentators and worldwide observers all have different opinions towards the 
factors contributing to this accident.  
 
According to CNN news report on April 26, 2014, the Chonghaejin Marine Co. 
purchased the ferry on October 2012 and refurbished it. Chonghaejin added extra 
passenger cabins on the third, fourth and fifth decks raising passenger capacity. This 
action would lead to altering the weight and balance of the vessel. A marine science 
and technology professor at Tokyo University stated during an interview by CNN that 
the modification was part of the reason for the accident because the company bought 
a used vessel from Japan and added extra cabins. Since the extra cabins were built on 
the top of the ship, it thus shifted the centre of gravity upward. However, various 
O 
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news reports found out that the Sewol Ferry has gone through regulatory and safety 
checks which were conducted by the Korean Register of Shipping. It is unclear if 
there were any problems with the regulatory and safety checks.  
 
Table 2: Mainstream viewpoints covered by different media groups 
 
Media  Factors contributing to this accident 
Aljazeera 
 The third mate of Sewol Ferry ordered a sharp turn which caused the ship to 
list. 
 The vessel was actually owned by a dubious company and the president of 
this company got permission for major modifications of the SEWOL Ferry 
through illegal activities. 
Bloomberg 
 Cargo management. The Vessel was carrying too much cargo with too little 
ballast water.  
 Ferry operator’s lacking of safety awareness. 
 Unreliable regulatory and safety checks. 
CNN  
 Unreasonable major modifications to the vessel through illegal methods. 
 Extreme system failure from the company to the government. 
 Classic case of corruption between government agencies, associations and 
corporations. 
 The Korean Culture that takes government safeguards or proper inspections 
of safety requirements for granted.  
New York  
Times 
 The captain’s decision to abandon the ship. 
 The crew’s emergency performance and clearly a breakdown in safety 
training, which could be attributed to its officers and to Korean regulators. 
 There were no safety instructions before passengers boarded the ship. 
 Life jackets were on the fourth floor where the sleeping cabins were, but 
those who were on the third floor at the time had no life jackets. 
 
If we look inward on this disaster, the sinking of the ferry might be viewed as a 
reflection of a system failure. Due to a lack of enough surveillance, the company took 
advantage of relationships between government agencies, associations and 
corporations so as to increase passenger loads and cargo loads. On the other hand, 
Korean people might expect a little bit more from the government. They should not 
take safety initiatives, safeguards, and proper inspections of safety requirements 
conducted by the government for granted.  
 
Another perspective to view this accident is the information from AL Jazeera English. 
According to the report published on AL Jazeera English on April 16, 2014, the third 
mate of Sewol Ferry ordered a sharp turn which caused the ship to list. As a result, 
the ferry lost stability. This was likely because the cargo and cars inside the ship 
began to move. In minutes, the ship reported an emergency and asked for assistance.  
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The sudden sharp turn makes us wonder if the ship was off course, and the third 
mate tried to correct it before the captain noticed. What was the captain doing at that 
time? Was he on the bridge? Would the captain know better about how to rectify the 
situation when there is a sharp alteration causing cargo shifting and vessel listing? 
How can a huge ship sink off the coast South Korea? In Table 2 we summarized and 
presented various voices for readers‟ further concern.  
 
Basing on the viewpoints presented in Table 1 and Table 2, it is clear that factors 
contributing to the ferry disaster could be categorized into the following groups.  
  
 Ship construction and ship structure 
 
Although South Korea is one of the world‟s ship building kingdoms, and it is capable 
of manufacturing such kind of ferry, South Korea has not yet enhanced its shipping 
standards and safety regulations with the result that tourists become victims of the 
accident on board a second-hand ship built in Japan. From 2,000, China has set 
strict regulations on purchasing second-hand ferries due to safety concerns. Usually, 
aged ferries of more than 20 years old are prohibited from operation in China. Sewol 
Ferry is an aged ferry built nearly 20 years ago, and was purchased by the 
Chonghaejin Marine Co. It was soon discovered that Chonghaejin Marine made 
major modifications to increase the capacity of the ship, and as such the vessel 
become heavier than it used to be. This caused steering and stability problems, 
pointed out by the vessel‟s regular captain. Not mentioning the modifications of the 
ship, Sewol ferry follows strict regulations and safety checks when it operates in 
Japan, and it sails in routes that are more suitable for commuting.  
 
 Cargo management 
  
Kim Han Shik, the CEO of Chonghaejin Marine Co., was accused of homicide 
through occupational negligence. Sewol Ferry was carrying too much cargo with too 
little ballast water, according to Bloomberg on May 8, 2014, and this has made the 
vessel unstable. In addition, cargo on board was not lashed correctly so it further 
contributed to the listing trend of the vessel.  
 
 More human errors 
 
Apart from the factors of the ferry itself, this disaster is mostly attributed to factors 
related to the incapability of the ferry operator, a lack of awareness of safety 
management among crews, and other human errors. Furthermore, a lack of 
emergency evacuation capability is also an important factor. The captain and the 
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crew did not have passengers evacuate to the open deck and wait for rescue.  
 
According to memories of some survivors, they were requested to stay still within 
their cabins until water was above their necks. “I repeatedly told people to calm 
themselves and stay where they were for an hour” said Kang Hae-seong, the 
communications officer on the South Korean ferry than sank.  
 
As reported in the New York Times on April 17, 2014, the communications officer 
indicated that he could not remember how to handle any evacuation drills for the 
huge ship so he did not have time to refer to the evacuation manual when the real 
emergency came. It took two and a half hours for the ferry to submerge in waters, 
and before that no crew members had assisted or even notified passengers to escape 
from where they were staying, nor did the captain and ship‟s crew use the abandon 
ship drill to notify passengers before they themselves abandoned the ship, leaving 
passengers to sink with the vessel. 
  
 Safety issue not being regarded highly by the Korea government  
 
Some commentator thought that this accident is a typical result of human error 
which reflects the safety issue not being highly regarded by the society in South 
Korea. Some even accused the Korea government of caring too much about the 
economic development, making profits and increasing the reputation of enterprises 
at the price of increasing public welfare. Another widely spread comment is that 
because of a culture that teaches everyone to obey rules in particular, this is what 
made students follow the instructions and stay in their cabins.  
 
A subtle observation was that marine accident expert claimed that the ferry is 
equipped with 46 life boats with a capacity of 25 people each, but only one life boat 
automatically opened. Moreover, with this kind of rescue equipment the vessel was 
said to have successfully been through regulatory and safety checks, conducted by the 
Korean Register of Shipping. 
 
 Extreme system failure from the company to the government 
 
This accident is widely considered a classic case of corruption between government 
agencies, associations and corporations in Korea. Further evidence supports this 
opinion. Chonghaejin Marine is found to be actually owned by a group which had a 
very dubious reputation, having been implicated in a number of ugly scandals and 
declared bankruptcy in 1997. Therefore, it is alleged that the president of this 
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dubious company actually got permission for the major modifications of the Sewol 
Ferry through illegal activities or through bribery. 
 
Are there any other factors? Did the government manage the rescue operations 
properly? Did rescue teams react efficiently and effectively? The captain was covering 
for the ship‟s regular captain, and it is said that he had no power to stop the cargo 
overloads that contributed to the disaster. As captain, however, he could have 
refused to sail. 
 
Furthermore it was discovered that Chonghaejin Marine made major modifications 
to increase the capacity of the ship, and as such the vessel became heavier than it 
used to be. This caused steering and stability problems, as pointed out by the vessel‟s 
regular captain. Newstapa, an investigative journal in Korea, reported that a team of 
four government employees inspected 12 ships at once, spending only 13 minutes on 
each. It was also reported that the owner of the ferry spent only $50 for the crew 
training for the entire year of 2013.  
 
It becomes clear that many factors contributed to the accident. Still, many observers 
do not understand why this turned out to be a tragedy when it could have been 
prevented? As it took two and a half hours for the ferry to submerge in water and the 
acccident happened within 15 miles of the coast and in the immediate vicinity of 
many islands, the first rescue groups could arrive within 10-15 minutes. 
 
The disaster should not have been a tragedy,  
 
If the captain had notified the passengers to leave their cabins; 
If everyone had had a life jacket; 
If the crewmembers had had knowledge of emergency rescue; 
If safety instructions had been announced before passengers boarded the ferry; 
If the crew had been certified to be trained; 
If regulatory and safety checks had been strictly followed; 
If the ship had not been permitted to make major modifications; 
If everyone had been trained or nurtured with a sense of safety….  
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Photography by Fang Zhang, 2013 
 
et each part of the chain have neglected their duty. The crew, and officers, 
had no training in emergency procedures, or, it seems, basic seamanship. The 
owners did not provide it, the government inspectors did not care, and the 
officers apparently did not see any need for it. The third mate was said to alter course 
sharply. Why? The captain was not on the bridge? Would that captain know anything 
better? A sharp course alteration in rough seas with unfixed cargo meant that the 
cargo shifted and the vessel listed sharply and began taking on water.  
 
During this disaster, we have at least three human errors due to irresponsibility. First 
error: designing a ship without the necessary stability against tilting. All 
new passenger ships have numerous decks, to heights never before experienced, 
creating a situation where the centre of gravity is at a very high level. A sharp turn 
was enough to tilt the ship. All those ships should have ballast down below, 
calculated or tested with models, so that tilting is impossible under any 
circumstances. Second error: the irresponsible order to stay inside cabins. 
Third error: as happened with the Costa Concordia, the captain and the crew were 
among the first to flee instead of taking care of the passengers. 
 
 
Y 
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The children obeyed order and therefore did not try to escape, and those who are 
raised to obey orders are less 
likely to think for themselves, 
less likely to not take their own 
responsibility, and less likely 
to be able to make their own 
decisions. Perhaps even the 
captain was somebody who 
needed orders from a higher 
authority? Government 
agencies, finally, kept sending 
out inaccurate information.  
 
An accident happened, and 
along with it comes great loss. 
While we cannot change what 
has happened, what we can do 
is prevent such accidents from 
happening again in the future. 
The astonishing thing about 
this maritime tragedy is gross 
human error and 
incompetence in one of the 
most educated and technologically advanced nations in the world, South Korea. For 
Koreans, they may have more to reflect upon, while, for the rest of others over the 
world, we care more about safety of life at sea.  
 
There are organizations that regulate safety issues at sea. For example, Safety of Life 
at Sea (SOLAS) requires that lifeboats be capable of being loaded, launched and 
maneuvered away from the ship within 30 minutes of the Master‟s signal to abandon 
ship. Furthermore, each and every crewmember is required to receive training in 
emergency procedures, safety, security, and first aid, and to participate in an 
abandon ship drill and a fire drill once every month. The International Safety 
Management Code (ISM) provides an international standard for the safety 
management and operation of ships and for pollution prevention. The purpose of 
ISM Code is: To ensure safety at sea; to prevent human injury or loss of life; and to 
avoid damage to the environment and to the ship. 
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part from the international standards for the safety of all ships at sea, there is 
literature analyzing factors which lead to ferry accidents. Lu and Yang (2011) 
empirically evaluated the safety climate and safety behavior in the passenger 
ferry context, and they identified five main dimensions of safety climate as measured 
on a passenger ferry safety climate scale, which from the contemporary standpoint 
are easily understandable and applicable. The five main dimensions are: safety policy, 
safety motivation, emergency preparedness, safety training, and safety 
communication. The 
study findings show the 
relationship between the 
main dimensions and 
crewmember safety 
behaviors in terms of 
safety compliance and 
safety participation. 
Respondent‟s age, ferry 
capacity, and safety 
compliance were also 
revealed to be associated 
with one another during their research. As one of the important contributions, the 
research offered implications on how to increase safety in ferry operations and how 
to develop safety management. 
 
One of the research findings is that the respondents‟ level of agreement with the 
safety climate can be summarized. According to Figure 5, the top five agreed safety 
climate attributes are:  
 
 My company informs workers about risks associated with their work. 
 My company provides workers with safety related information. 
 My company responds quickly to safety related problems. 
 My company has set up a work safety rule. 
 Safety training programs have been adopted in my workplace. 
 
Among the above agreed safety climate attributes, “my company informs workers 
about risks associated with their work” and “my companies provides workers with 
safety related information” belong to the safety communication-related dimension. 
These hypotheses, however, were proved to be not supported by this study. 
 
 
A 
Featured Research and Interviews 
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Figure 5: Respondents’ agreement with safety climate attributes 
 
Note: The mean scores were based on a five-point scale (1= very unimportant to 5 = very important agree); 
Adapted from Lu and Yang (2011) 
 
Lu and Yang (2011) further found that only safety training and emergency 
preparedness are major indicators of safety behavior in the context of passenger ferry 
operations. In their analysis, most of the safety climate dimensions are highly related 
to safety behavior. Thus, passenger ferry managers should pay more attention to 
safety climate since it is a crucial factor that influences self-reported safety behavior 
in passenger ferry operations. Another research finding summarized in Figure 6, 
indicates respondents‟ perceptions of each safety behavior. According to Figure 6, 
three of the seven safety behavior attributes rank notably higher than the other 
attributes, namely, “I comply with safety rules and standard operational procedures”, 
“I do not neglect safety, even when in a rush” and “I maintain safety awareness at 
work”.  
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Figure 6: Respondents’ agreement with self-reported behavior attributes 
 
Note: The mean scores were based on a five-point scale (1= very unimportant to 5 = very important agree); 
Adapted from Lu and Yang (2011) 
 
In Lu and Yang (2011)‟s research, several implications can be drawn among which 
safety climate is the factor of most influence where it boosts safety training and 
emergency preparedness. Safety climate plays a crucial part in passenger ferry 
operations in terms of self-reported safety behavior, thus it must be attached with 
importance by managers. Second, since safety training and emergency preparedness 
are proved to be positively related to safety behavior, an environment that boosts 
such activities is significant so as to lead to better safety behavior and further reduce 
accidence occurrences. 
 
Lu and Tseng (2012) identified crucial safety assessment criteria for passenger ferry 
services by which ferry safety and difference between various ferry parties‟ 
perception of safety importance were compared. Respondents‟ perceptions of the 
importance of safety assessment items are summarized in Figure 7. Among all those 
items the respondents were asked to rate, ship construction, ship repair and 
maintenance record, firefight facility, rescue equipment, and emergency exit are the 
top five most important ferry safety assessment ones. Further analysis taxonomizes 
these items into six different factors or dimensions of safety assessment items, 
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namely: safety equipment, ship structure, ship documentation inspection, safety 
instructions, and navigation and communication, and crew members‟ ability.  
 
Figure 7: Respondents’ perceptions of the importance of safety assessment items 
 
Note: The mean scores were based on a five-point scale (1= very unimportant to 5 = very important agree); 
Adapted from Lu and Tseng (2012) 
 
Lu and Tseng (2012) have also investigated the differences in the importance of ferry 
safety assessment criteria from different perspectives. Figures 8, 9, 10, 11 
summarized the means scores of the level of importance of safety assessment item(s) 
perceived by different parties. Further analysis of the each party‟s perceptions of the 
importance of safety assessment items indicates that from ferry operators‟ 
perspective, rescue equipment and crew member’s ability were two factors of the 
utmost importance in the safety of passenger ferry context, according to Figure 8. 
While, in the passengers‟ point of view shown in Figure 9, ship construction and ship 
repair and maintenance record were two critical factors of ferry safety, and these 
two items are regarded highly by academics as well, which is indicated in Figure 10. 
According to Figure 11, it is notable that ferry governors regard ship construction the 
highest too. 
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Figure 8: Mean scores of ferry operators’ perceptions of the importance of safety 
assessment items 
 
 
Figure 9: Mean scores of passengers’ perceptions of the importance of safety 
assessment items 
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Figure 10: Mean scores of academics’ perceptions of the importance of safety 
assessment items 
 
Figure 11: Mean scores of ferry governors’ perceptions of the importance of safety 
assessment items 
 
Note: The mean scores were based on a five-point scale (1= very unimportant to 5 = very important agree); 
Adapted from Lu and Tseng (2012) 
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asing on the above analysis, Lu and Tseng (2012) further provided policy 
implications to individual parties. According to their study, for ferry 
governors, compared with other interest parties, they should attach a higher 
level of importance to safety equipment, ship structure, ship documentation 
inspection, safety instructions, and crew members‟ ability dimensions. Ferry 
governors are suggested not only to enhance crewmember‟s ability through regular 
safety training, but also to enhance their ability to respond to an emergency 
effectively by way of increasing knowledge in rescue procedures. It is also advised 
that ferry governors should attach more attention to safety assessment criteria, such 
as safety equipment, ship structure, safety instructions, ship documentation 
inspection, and navigation and communication, in particular. 
 
Though several studies regarding the ship safety have been conducted in some 
specific areas, the research on safety assessment criteria for passenger ferry services 
is still rare. This study contributes a helpful approach to measuring the level of 
importance of safety assessment criteria and dimensions by four stakeholder groups. 
The authors believe that the adoption of such assessment criteria will help improve 
the effectiveness of safety audits, and furthermore, it could be used as key safety 
performance indicators for benchmarking. 
 
Conclusion 
 
To conclude, a lot of researchers have pointed out that the way in which 
crewmembers respond in an accident greatly influences the loss. Gossard (1995) 
reported that when ship‟s crew members have responded professionally to accidents 
this has often prevented loss of both the ship and lives. Williamson et al. (1997) has 
also pointed out that a crew‟s emergency response behavior is an important factor for 
improving maritime safety. Moreover, the safety awareness and safety climate as well 
as the value a social culture holds have a great impact on accident evacuation. Last 
but not the least, the main indicator of a great nation should be the welfare of the 
public rather than the economic development and global reputation, especially when 
such reputation is established at the price of public welfare.  
 
 
 
 
B 
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INTERVIEW WITH PROF. CHIN-SHAN LU 
BY DR XINYU SUN AND MISS FANG ZHANG 
 
 
Q1: What has driven you to conduct quality research regarding the safety 
issues in the context of the shipping and ferry industries? 
 
Prof. Lu: There are two concerns that drive me to conduct quality research 
regarding safety issues in the context of the shipping and ferry industries. From the 
practical point of view, safety must come first for both industries. In particular, it 
would be better to have no other services if customers‟ safety could not be guaranteed. 
Over the past few years, maritime accidents have happened around the world, such 
as the Costa Concordia disaster in 2012, the Lamma ferry accident in Hong Kong last 
year, and several months ago, the Sewol ferry sank off South Korea. Being a 
researcher, I want to figure out the factors contributing to maritime accidents so as 
to help the industry to promote safety behavior. Secondly, although international 
organizations such as the IMO have set strict safety regulations and codes of conduct, 
accidents still happen which are largely attributed to human elements which go 
beyond policies and regulations. As such, conducting research in finding 
relationships between maritime accidents and human safety behavior is necessary 
especially when there is little literature focusing on safety issues in the maritime 
industry and only safety-related reports released by relevant organizations and 
associations, e.g. P & I club.    
 
Q2: What implications have your research findings provided to help 
boost maritime safety so far?  
 
Prof. Lu: Three major implications have come from our research. First and 
Prof. Chin-Shan Lu, Director of C.Y Tung International 
Centre for Maritime Studies, and also Professor of the 
Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies at The 
Hong Kong Polytechnic University, has been dedicated 
to the safety research in the context of the shipping and 
ferry industries for decades. His relevant research 
about safety issues has been published in international 
journals such as the Journal of Business Ethics, 
Journal of Safety, Accident Analysis & Prevention, and 
Safety Science. We are privileged to have Prof. Lu to 
share his research with us. 
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foremost, we have identified safety assessment criteria by way of collecting and 
consolidating varied parties‟ voices. Previously, there were no explicit safety 
assessment criteria. Instead, operators of shipping and ferry industries conduct 
regulatory and routine safety checks mostly on facilities along with the fundamental 
requirement that laws regulate. Different groups, such as the passengers, 
governments, academics and operators, would however, have different requirements. 
Thus the safety assessment criteria we provide would be rather inclusive and 
all-rounded. The second important result we have got is the significance of safety 
management. The following questions should be addressed when it comes to the 
safety management. Do companies promote and nurture a working culture of safety? 
Are employees reminded of the importance of safety behavior? Lastly, we 
investigated if passengers are aware of their personal safety when boarding ferries 
and if they know how to respond to emergency situations.       
 
Q3: Will you further your research in the safety area in the years to come? 
What would be the next step? Are there any perspectives on the research 
area you would like to share with us? 
 
Prof. Lu: Presently, there are three major international journals with special 
commitment to the safety issues, namely, Accident Analysis & Prevention, Journal 
of Safety Research, and Safety Science. The former two journals are focusing on 
transport safety in particular, and the later is more inclusive.  In the future, I will do 
more interesting and innovative research with regards to the maritime safety. 
Implications from my previous safety research are applicable to container shipping 
as well. In my opinion, the thought leadership would be a gateway to further 
explorations about safety leadership and safety behavior. Based on this 
understanding, last year I have submitted a research proposal about thought 
leadership to apply for a Government Research Fund in Hong Kong.    
 
Recently, I started to think about a new research field, ethics and safety. I think that 
those who unconsciously behave ethically will be more aware of safety, and ethics 
might come from education, religion and family influences. From my point of view, 
ethical leadership will to a great extent help boost safety behavior in companies. I 
have published a paper titled “The Effects of Ethical Leadership and Ethical Climate 
on Employee Ethical Behavior in the International Port Context” in the Journal of 
Business Ethics where I explored and examined the relationship between ethical 
leadership and safety.  
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In the past, however, almost all ethics-related literature discussed how business 
corporations dealt with ethical problems, such as protecting confidential information 
and not appropriating public assets and capital. Little research discussed the 
application of ethics in the area of safety. Therefore, I propose to further develop the 
sense of ethics in terms of maritime safety. It is reasonable if you put the sense of 
ethics in the following scenarios. For the first scenario, even if regulations are made 
perfect, if no one is ensuring the safe behavior, then regulations are in vain and 
nonsense. On the contrary, even if there are some shortcomings in established 
policies and regulations, if everyone is trained to behave in a much safer manner, 
then the overall consequence would be more positive. That‟s why I think ethical 
leadership and thought leadership will play a much more significant role in nurturing 
a safer environment. 
 
Q4: With regards to your research, do you have any comments on the 
ferry accident that happened in South Korea on April 17, 2014? 
 
Prof. Lu: Safety is like a series connection grouped with many components, with 
each component having its own responsibility. Crew members‟ training, captain and 
mates‟ skills, operator‟s safety management, crew members‟ emergency preparedness 
and passengers‟ awareness of safety are individual components which are 
independently from each other. The fact is that only if all these components stay 
normal can safety be ensured at a relatively higher level.  
 
In the case of the ferry sinking off South Korea, safety was decreased sharply due to 
each component not taking their responsibilities. Crew members lack enough 
training, as did the captain and the mates. It was said that the third mate‟s incorrect 
driving behavior caused the ferry‟s listing. Furthermore, the ferry did not follow 
international regulations and safety checks in terms of its construction and capacity. 
The company had made major modifications to the ferry, which had a great impact 
on its stability since gravity was shifted upwards.  Thirdly, incorrect cargo lashing 
contributed to the instability of the ferry as well. Cars and cargos in the ferry were 
not fixed, and as such they began moving to one side as the ferry was listing, which in 
turn made the ferry totally unbalanced and thus list more quickly. Apart from the 
mentioned contributors, the disaster led to so many people dying could have been 
prevented. Crew members did not organize an effective rescue. Last but not least, 
passengers who were like teachers and adults should have been more concerned with 
self-safety and should have taken their lead in stepping out of their cabins. If there 
was a lesson to be learnt from the passengers, it would be that we should not take the 
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government‟s and operator‟s safety initiative and protection for granted.    
 
Negligence of details turned out to be the major determinant of the Sewol Ferry 
accident. For the sake of safety, every component or process throughout the whole 
operation should be attached with as much attention as possible. Most importantly, 
safety is not only about regulations and operations, but also about awareness and 
ethics, and these should always be a focus in the future.  
 
Photography by Prof. Chin-Shan Lu, 2013 
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INTERVIEW WITH DR T.L. YIP  
BY DR XINYU SUN AND MISS FANG ZHANG 
 
 
Q1: What direction to date has your research taken in finding 
determinants of cruise-ship accident injuries?  
 
Dr Yip: Two years ago, after the Italian cruise ship Costa Concordia sank off the 
coast of Tuscany with a loss of 32 lives, global concerns were raised about the safety 
of the cruise industry. Together with other cruise ship accidents that had happened 
previously, the Costa Concordia Disaster has alerted us researchers once again to 
hold maritime safety in the highest regard. Furthermore, the Hong Kong 
Government issued an open tender in 2007 for the development of the new cruise 
terminal, and the Kai Tak Cruise Terminal is expected to help Hong Kong become a 
regional transport hub for cruise liners. In this regard, our research in the direction 
of investigating the determinants of the number of crew and passenger injuries in 
cruise ship accidents would be of help in controlling risk factors for the cruise 
industry. Thus far our research has explicitly examined the relationship between 
crew injury and passenger injury in cruise accidents.  
 
Q2: Are there any implications that have come from your research 
findings for the cruise industry on how to boost ferry safety? 
 
Dr Yip: Compared with cargo ships and ferry ships, cruise ships generally have a 
better ratio of crew to passenger which makes the sailings safer. Usually, cruise ships 
have a 1 to 2 ratio of crew to passengers, that is to say, there will be one crew for 
every two passengers, serving emergency duties in addition to their primary job. Our 
research findings showed that the safety of passengers on board of a cruise ship 
depends on the safety of the ship‟s crew members, and as such in order to ensure the 
safety of passengers on board, enhanced crew training is necessary so as to improve 
 
Dr T. L. Yip, is Associate Director of C. Y. Tung 
International Centre for Maritime Studies, and also 
Associate Professor of the Department of Logistics and 
Maritime Studies at The Hong Kong Polytechnic University.  
 
We are honored to have Dr Yip share his research regarding 
the safety of the cruise industry here. 
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crewmembers‟ safety. As can be seen from the ferry accidents, one of which 
happened in Hong Kong last year and the other one in South Korea, if the crew on 
board are more capable of handling emergency situations, there might be different 
results.      
Q3: With regards to your research findings, please share with us your 
suggestions on the following two aspects. For passengers, what steps 
should they take to keep safe on a cruise ship? For cruise lines, do they 
need to take more measures in order to ensure crew safety during the 
voyage? 
 
Dr Yip: There are few requirements for passengers except to follow safety 
instructions. However, more should be done by the cruise or ferry lines. Generally 
speaking, a half-day safety drill will be conducted every week on cargo ships where 
fewer crew take the whole charge of a vessel. Unlike cargo ships, cruise ships are 
more elaborately designed with increased fineness in terms of quality and 
construction. This means that safety drills on board cruise and ferry ships are less 
frequently conducted than those on board cargo ships. On the one hand, cruise ships 
sail along the coast where it is necessary to keep the ship stable, and as such even 
when emergencies occur, rescue could be done immediately. On the other hand, as 
was mentioned earlier, cruise ships keep a better ratio in terms of crew to passenger 
numbers, so every crew can take charge of a single issue instead of several crew 
having to take charge of all the safety work as happens on cargo ships.   
 
All in all, cruise ship sailings are one of the world‟s safest transportation methods. 
Cruise ships are well designed, carefully built, and equipped with advanced facilities. 
Moreover, captains of cruise ships are better paid and trained, and thus of much 
higher quality than those of other ships. Cruise ship sailings are also in compliance 
with international standards and regulations, and in most cases, cruise ship sailings 
follow code of conduct beyond the international standard regulations. Evidently, all 
these factors contribute to the fact that cruise ship accidents rarely happen. 
 
Q4: How can we control the risk factors that may contribute to 
cruise-ship accidents? Please share some of your opinions with the 
cruise-ship shareholders. Will you further your research in the cruise 
safety area in years to come? Are there any perspectives to share with us? 
 
Dr Yip: Our research findings indicate that the number of passenger injuries is 
positively related to that of crew injuries. Furthermore, the results of our analysis 
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suggest that the passenger safety on board can be improved through effective 
training of cruise-ship crews, which offers an insight to the cruise industry on how to 
ensure both their crew safety and the passenger safety. 
 
Apart from the above two factors, we have also identified other factors that 
contribute to elevated levels of injuries for crew and passengers during cruise-ship 
accidents. In particular, accidents associated with collisions would lead to a higher 
level of injuries for both crew and passengers. To control these risk factors, managers 
and regulators should cater their training programs to match different accident types 
including explosions, collisions, groundings and loss of vessel maneuverability. In 
addition, managers and regulators might also consider adopting new navigation 
technologies in cruise ships if necessary.  
 
Since we only explicitly 
examined relationships 
between the number of crew 
injuries and that of passenger 
injuries based on the collected 
history data of injuries in 
cruise ship accidents, we can 
only indicate that the cruise 
industry has to enhance crew 
safety through effective 
training so as to ensure 
passenger safety when in 
emergencies. In the future, 
research with regards to the 
difference between cruise 
safety and ferry safety in terms 
of factors that contribute to 
accidents and risk controls 
towards types of accident 
prevention will be further 
studied.                      Photography by Fang Zhang, 2014 
 
For detailed information about the research background and method, please refer to Dr T.L. Yip’s 
research paper titled “Determinants of Cruise-Ship Accident Injuries”. Should you be interested in 
the topic, please contact the author directly for further discussions. (Email: t.l.yip@polyu.edu.hk) 
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IMPORTANCE OF SAFETY AT SEA SHOWN 
THROUGH THE MARITIME ACCIDENT 
 Dr Hwa Young Kim  
Senior Researcher, Maritime Safety Research Center, 
Korea Ship Safety Technology Authority, Korea 
 
What happened in the South Sea of Korea?  
 
n April 16, 2014 at 8:55 AM, a ferry ship capsized 
and sank 1.5 miles north of Byeongpung-do, 
located off the southern coast of Korea. This ferry 
ship was carrying 476 passengers and crew. The majority of 
passengers were high school students who were heading to 
Jeju Island on their way for a field trip. A total of 172 
persons were rescued while 292 persons lost their lives 
including 12 people who are still missing and presumed to 
be dead. Cargoes loaded on this ship consisted of 124 
sedans, 223 1-ton trucks, 34 2.5-tons or larger cargo 
vehicles for 180 vehicles, with a total weight of 3,608 tons, including 1,157 tons of 
cargo. The name of this ship was “SeWol”, a ferry ship of 6,825 tons sailing regularly 
between Incheon port and Jeju port and was carrying passengers, trucks and 
containers simultaneously. The basic dimensions of this ship are as follows: full 
length of 146m; width of 22m; gross tonnage of 6,825 tons; speed of 21 Knots; the 
maximum number of permitted persons 921 along with 200 containers (based on 
10-ft); 130 sedans; and 60 cargo vehicles (based on 5 tons each); and the deadweight 
is 3,960 tons.  
 
Why did this accident take place? 
 
The Korean government has been investigating the cause of the ship capsizing. 
Therefore, it may be unwise to draw hasty conclusion, but this article is intended to 
examine the case with the objective contents displayed in the press to this point. This 
accident may be a result of hardware defect related to the ship‟s hull or due to safety 
management.  
 
 
 
O 
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 Hardware defect 
 
First, safety has not been secured due to unreasonable ship structure and 
modifications. This ship was built in Japan in 1994 and it was imported to Korea as a 
used ship in October 2012. Thereafter, the alteration of the ship was done to enlarge 
the cargo and passenger capacity. Because of this, it seems that GM (transverse 
metacentric height) of the ship was heightened which lowered the ship‟s stability. In 
addition, the ship was excessively loaded when it departed from the port of Incheon; 
also fuel, clean water and so forth were exhausted during sailing which could mean 
that the stability of the ship had clearly declined. Second, the ship was obsolete and 
also preventive maintenance had been neglected. The ship that is 20 years old 
requires more preventive maintenance on its steering wheel, power generator, engine 
and so forth than other vessels. However, according to the statement of a previous 
deck officer, the shipping company did not carry out any systematic preventive 
maintenance but instead did some breakdown maintenance as and when the need 
arose. Furthermore the shoring and lashing conditions for the cargo trucks and 
containers loaded on the ship were also defective. Because of this, when the ship was 
skewed toward starboard, it lost its stability and drastically capsized. In fact, for 
saving the costs, the shipping company is known to operate without proper lashing, 
shoring and hence cargo trucks and containers were loaded onto the ferry without 
doing so.  
 
 Management problems  
 
First of all, the ship was delayed while departing due to the mist at Incheon port but 
it still departed under the adverse weather situation. In other words, there was a lack 
of care on part of the management of ship. It is highly likely that the senior 
management forced the ship to depart to avoid any loss of profit. Second, in order to 
shorten the arrival time and to compensate for the delay in departure, the ship chose 
a route where it had to face a strong tidal current. Furthermore the ship was being 
handled by a junior and therefore not sufficiently experienced officer. If it chose to 
sail on shorter route, the master had to maneuver in a more dangerous zone, but 
there was no awareness on safety regarding this. Third, after facing such a severe 
ship accident, at the initial time period the crews totally lacked emergency response 
capability. After the accident, crews were expected to follow the safety management 
manual to evacuate passengers first and help out with the rescue but they chose to 
abandon the ship and passengers to evacuate themselves from the ship first. This 
ship actually had the procedure for the emergency situation in its safety management 
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regulation, but it was not followed under the actual situation. And fourth, after the 
ship accident, there was no prompt rescue system, and as a result of the lack of 
management in the control tower, there was a delay in the rescue, resulting in an 
inability to save more passengers. After first receiving the report of the marine 
accident, it can be seen that they had two hours until the complete sinking of the ship, 
but the responsive system of Korean Coast Guard (KCG), and government agencies 
were poorly organized and not prepared to handle the fallout of this marine disaster.  
 
What needs to be done to prevent these accidents in the future? 
 
ue to this maritime tragedy, a few suggestions have been made with regards 
to passengers as well as with regards to the shipping company. Some 
measures needs to be implemented to prevent such disaster from not only 
occurring in Korea but throughout the world, as well as planning how to respond in 
the future. In case of passengers, first of all, there has to be the awareness of safety at 
all times and it has to be part of the culture. Korea has made dramatic developments 
to escape poverty and war, and improve democratization and economic advancement. 
While having such a speedy growth process, awareness on safety is never a priority 
and people have a strong tendency to consider it as a nuisance. However, there is a 
need to recognize high awareness and culture on safety in order to evolve into an 
advanced country. And second, passengers getting on the passenger ships will 
definitely have the concern about safety as well. The passenger ship company should 
actually implement the drills that they are supposed to implement when passengers 
embark on the ship, and the passengers embarked on the ship should actively 
participate in the drills for preparation in times of emergency.  
 
The safety management plan of business also has to be established and the safety 
management has to be strengthened. Executives have to consider safety as a cost 
which cannot be neglected during education or training with their employees. As 
proved through this accident, safety may determine the very existence of the 
company. Therefore, executives of a shipping company have to establish the safety 
management plan to fully monitor the safety management issues. In addition, drills 
to experience the emergency situation have to be practiced in order to understand 
the safety management techniques during the actual situation, not just to consider it 
as a “dead knowledge” found only in documents. Second, unlike the crews for 
ocean-going ship, crews in the coastal ships have become older. The ship companies 
have to make efforts to secure younger crewmen with rich, specialized knowledge, 
while the government also has to contribute towards this in order to avoid any 
D 
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unbalance in crew qualification in ocean-going ships and coastal ships by reviewing 
the policies on crew members. Third, the system has to be overhauled to retire those 
obsolete ships from domestic routes and not allow them to sail again if they are of a 
certain age or beyond. In such events wherein there are many passengers in the 
passenger ship, a separate system has to be made to enable safe ship operation. For 
this particular reason where the coastal shipping company that does not have 
sufficient financial means, the government has to review certain plans to procure the 
financial resource at low interest rates. And fourth, the search and rescue response 
system needs to be prepared for possible maritime accidents and also have to be 
maintained with the disaster management system in case of a maritime accident 
through major overhauling. A powerful control tower has to be structured to enable 
immediate implementation of a prompt and flawless rescue and search when any 
marine accident occurs. Furthermore, there has to be a joint system of rescue and 
search with surrounding countries.  
 
Securing safety in an open sea is like the foundation to support the maritime logistics. 
If the safety and security collapsed in the sea, it is difficult to maintain the maritime 
logistics network. Therefore, the researchers around the world have to consider 
prevention and response measures against marine accidents along with the 
presentation of alternatives in the Asian region as well as on the global scale.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photography by Fang Zhang, 2014
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or shipping industry, the Corporate Security Policy refers to a company's 
procedures and guidelines for maintaining the safety and integrity of its 
people, assets and customer's cargo, etc. To demonstrate their commitment 
to supply chain security, most shipping companies have endorsed Corporate Security 
Policies to guide their staff both ashore and at sea on how different staff levels can 
contribute to ensure the safety and integrity of the whole shipping logistics network. 
Shipping companies have also offered their utmost effort and cooperation to the 
authorities in their fight against any unlawful act on maritime or cargo security. Such 
acts may include, but not limited to terrorist attack, piracy, cargo pilferage and 
smuggling. 
 
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is a voluntary supply 
chain security program led by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and 
focuses on improving the security of the private companies' supply chains with 
respect to terrorism (U.S. CBP Website); Partners in Protection (PIP) is a Canada 
Border Services Agency (CBSA) voluntary program that enlists the cooperation of 
private industry to enhance border and trade chain security, combat organized crime 
and terrorism and help detect and prevent contraband smuggling (CBSA Website); 
Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) is developed by the European Commission 
(EC) and can be defined as a party involved in the international movement of goods 
in whatever function that has been approved by or on behalf of a national Customs 
administration as complying with World Customs Organization (WCO) or equivalent 
supply chain security standards(European Commission).  
 
To date, C-TPAT (U.S.), PIP (Canada) and AEO (EC) are the main 
government-business initiatives which aim to promote and strengthen overall supply 
chain and border security. These programs recognize that the highest level of supply 
chain security can only be achieved through closer cooperation with the ultimate 
owners of the supply chain.  
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Taking the U.S. as an example, CBP's Office of Air and Marine (OAM), a critical 
component of CBP's layered enforcement strategy for border security, has made 
great contributions to US Border Security in the past. As can be seen 
from the statistics, OAM's achievements during Fiscal Year 2013 
included but were not limited to the followings: 
 
 1,015,075.89 pounds of marijuana seized with a value of over $2.6 billion  
 155,120.44 pounds of cocaine seized with a value of over $11.6 billion  
 $25.3 million in currency seized  
 2,194 weapons seized 
 
From the above figures, we can imagine that smuggling has been and will be one of 
the most dangerous security issues in the container shipping industry; containers are 
considered to be integral to an extensive range of smuggling operations. Compared 
with the annual global throughputs of 420 million containers, only about two percent 
of targeted shipments are inspected by customs officials. 
 
The revolution of containerization in the international trade has had a positive 
impact on the decrease of cargo pilferage throughout the global supply chain. Yet, it 
has likewise become an ideal umbrella to the organized criminal activities, mainly 
due to the particularity of the cargo journey from the origin to the final destination, 
such as combined land and ocean transit. 
 
In the following, we present three recent cases encountered by a shipping company. 
Two of them are about cargo theft while the other one is about cigarettes smuggling.  
 
 Case 1: Cargo Pilferage at Port of Le Havre 
 
An increasing trend has been observed in pilfering incidents at Port of Le Havre in 
these recent years. 
 
On August 05 2013, a container ship was berthed at Port of Le Havre to load and 
discharge cargo. Realizing that the Port of Le Havre is a high-risk place of cargo 
pilferage, the vessel has taken additional preventive measures to maintain high 
vigilance against any possibility of cargo theft.  
 
At 6am, during a routine security patrol, the duty AB found that the seals of several 
containers stowed on bay 05 decks were missing, while broken seals were seen 
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nearby. The duty AB reported his findings to the duty officer promptly, and then the 
case was brought to Ship Safety Officer (SSO) and the Master's attention. 
The SSO and the Master arrived at the scene of the incident a few minutes afterwards, 
and the Master ordered a thorough investigation in order to determine the radical 
movement of the broken seals. Later, it was found that a total of five containers have 
been tampered with, and additionally some empty packing boxes were found 
scattered beneath containers and on the catwalks nearby. It was suspected that this 
might be the case of cargo pilferage. In order to find the origin of these empty 
packages, these five tampered containers were opened by the ship's crew under the 
supervision of the SSO and the Master, and there was no surprise that one container 
was found to have some cargo missing with the packing matching exactly with those 
empty boxes. The cargo was perfume from a renowned brand of France. Apparently, 
the thieves had stolen the perfumes and left behind the packing boxes. Later on these 
five containers were resealed using shipboard High Security Seals. 
 
According to cargo operation records, these five broken-seal containers were loaded 
at a previous port and all seals had been physically checked by the ship's crew after 
the container was loaded on board. Security patrols were taken out regularly during 
sea passage from the last port, and there were no abnormal findings. All crew had 
been interviewed by the SSO and nobody was found to have been involved in this 
incident. 
 
The terminal manager and local agent were informed about the incident.  
 
There were good reasons to suspect that the incident had happened during cargo 
operation at Port of Le Havre. The master reported the accident to the ship owner, 
while at the same time he issued a Statement of Fact and requested terminal to carry 
out further investigation into this incident. 
 
 Case 2: Cargo pilferage at Suez Anchorage 
 
On October 16 2013, a container vessel was anchored in Suez North Anchorage 
waiting for Canal transit. The ship's crew was alerted about theft activities in this 
area and preventive actions were brought against any possibility of theft prior to 
arrival. Regular deck safety/security patrols were arranged and performed at an 
interval of 30 minutes. 
 
Soon after the vessel had anchored, the duty crew member patrolling deck and 
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surrounding areas suddenly caught sight of one intruder on the catwalk of forward 
bays. He then shouted at the intruder and immediately reported the case to the duty 
officer via VHF radio, who when promptly sounded the general alarm from the 
bridge. Simultaneously, the duty crew member heard many footsteps retreating 
hastily to port side of the vessel's forecastle; obviously there was more than one 
intruder. Thinking about the possible safety threat, the duty crew member did not 
attempt to pursue the intruders. Soon after he heard some mixed sounds and noticed 
that the intruders might have leaped into the water and escaped. A few minutes later, 
when he came to the forecastle together with other crew members, they saw one 
speed boat at a distance of about 50 meters moving away quickly from the ship's 
bow. 
 
The ship‟s crew carried out a thorough inspection and found that a total of 17 
container seals were broken or missing while six containers had signs of tampering.  
 
As per incident reporting procedures, the Master reported the incident to the ship 
owner and local authority (Suez Canal Inspectors). All containers involved in this 
accident were resealed using High Security Seals as per the owner‟s instruction. 
 
 Case 3: Cigarettes Smuggling  
 
On November 25 2013, at one of the Malaysia‟s Container Terminals, four 40ft reefer 
containers were detained by local Customs after being discharged from the ship. 
These reefers were transshipment cargo and their final destination was Pusan, South 
Korea. The shipments were ordered for further inspection under Customs Act.  
 
The carrier immediately notified the shipper of this incident. In reply, the shipper 
strongly requested the carrier to challenge the Customs' decision and claimed that 
the Customs should not open their containers without reasonable cause. The request 
was totally denied since nobody had the right to go against the Customs Act.  
 
As a follow-up, the shipper anxiously provided excuses and requested the carrier to 
negotiate with Customs to release the shipments as soon as possible. The shipper 
claimed in the letter: 
   
 The mentioned reefer containers had been wrongly sent to Port Kelang and 
they were thought to have been transited at another port; 
 These containers were still in trade zone and under transshipment status; 
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 Consignee at Port Kelang would not accept these wrong shipments; 
 The Marine insurance policy contained “original seals” clause; 
 Consignee at final destination would not accept cargos if no original seals were 
applied. 
 
Apparently, some of the above conditions were unreasonable. 
 
There was no 
doubt that 
inspections were 
performed as 
scheduled by 
Customs Officers. 
Finally, three out 
of those four 
reefer containers 
were found to 
have no problem 
and were 
released by 
Customs to the 
shipper for 
re-export to the 
final destination. 
Only the fourth container was found to have cargo discrepancies against the cargo 
manifest and cartons of cigarettes were found by Customs Officers. Therefore, this 
container was detained for further investigation. 
 
Apparently, this was the event of foul declaration and also an attempt of smuggling of 
cigarettes by the shipper. The carrier immediately took proper preventive actions in 
order to protect their interests. They also held the shipper fully responsible for their 
fault and reserved their rights to recoup any costs and penalties from the shipper that 
might arise from this incident.    
                                   
SUMMARY  
 
We have learned from above cases that the global cargo theft risk is one of the biggest 
concerns to supply chain security as the extent of risks vary greatly between different 
Photography by Fang Zhang, 2012 
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countries and regions. Shipping companies and port authorities continually face 
different challenges of supply chain security. As per UK P&I Club, the estimated 
yearly costs of cargo crime are between US$30-50 billion globally. The cargo theft 
threats are typically rooted in social, economic and cultural conditions.  
 
orts, terminals and depots are the most favored locations for this kind of 
offense, as well as land transport. Ship operators also claim that they are also 
the focal point of cargo crime, one of the reasons being that the ship is more 
easily accessed than that of other facilities. Cargo in transit may involve a long 
journey and various handling procedures in different places, and this may present a 
risk of undetected cargo pilferage. Often it is extremely difficult to identify where and 
when an incident has taken place and who did this.  
 
The prevention of cargo theft requires awareness and efforts from different parties 
within the whole supply chain, such as, shippers, ship operators, terminals, 
authorities and so on. More and more security measures have been taken in every 
aspect of the supply chain. For example, a mechanism called the High Security Seal 
(HSS) is used by industry for securing containers, and the HSS must conform to the 
ISO 17712:2010 standards (effective from March 1 2012) in order to be accepted by 
customs internationally. The HSS is so designed and manufactured to provide 
tamper evidence and some degree of security. The integrity of container seals 
provides evidence that the cargo has remained secure throughout its journey. But the 
HSS is not an anti-theft device, and it can be easily tampered during a criminal act. 
 
Nowadays information technology is playing a more important role in the integration 
of security practices with efficient operation and information flows. Its power to 
track cargo through the supply chain has brought great benefits to supply chain 
security. An electronic submission of key data (EDI) is essential in container 
targeting for inspections and terminal operations planning.  
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HE Snowden affair (in which Hong Kong played a not insignificant role) and 
the discussion on cyber security have rekindled interest on the negative 
potential of the internet. If not addressed immediately this debate about the 
control of the digital global commons, could to a large extent undermine the huge 
positive gains that have accrued, large due to global connectivity to all strata of the 
society. Instead it just might become a basis of a future global conflict. 
 
The idea of the „global village‟ might also be negatively impacted if consensus is not 
arrived at amicably by nations and communities themselves with regards to laws and 
regulations which would be applicable to this phenomenon. The process of 
ascertaining and enforcing the „rules of the game‟ is highly contentious. Having said 
this, the debate must take place with the right earnestness if common ground should 
be discovered as soon as possible. 
 
While this unprecedented global digital connectivity has provided numerous 
opportunities for billions all over the world including individuals as well as groups 
large and small, threats such as cyber hacking and malware, are simultaneously 
attempting to erode the trust that  these billions have put in these networks. This is 
despite governments attempting to address these issues by creating mechanisms to 
discourage misuse. The very transnational nature of cyberspace constrains the efforts 
to regulate it and has forced the international community to come to the negotiating 
table.  
 
The United Nations (UN) too has been endeavoring without success for over a decade 
to develop a consensus amongst member nations with regards to regulation of 
cyberspace. But the gap between the views held by respective national state 
governments is too wide and not easily bridgeable. 
 
The conflict is basically about two issues. The first issue deals with matters where 
stakeholders are unable to agree upon the inclusion of new threats posed by States 
themselves who exploit ICTs for military and security purposes. Secondly, they are 
constrained by inability to focus on information content or information 
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infrastructures. There are also significantly different opinions regarding the control 
of trans-border information content. Opposing calls for state control over 
information, most governments argue that it is their unalienable sovereign right to 
approve or ban information transmitted into national territory from outside its 
borders should it be deemed harmful for their countries. 
 
Several incidents in the recent past have highlighted the destructive power of 
disruption in communications between the government and its citizens using 
cyberspace, which severely impacted governance and usage of basic utility services 
infrastructure, leading to chaos and confusion.  
 
Cyber Security and Maritime Transport 
 
ecent statistics show that about 70% of the goods traffic is carried by 
maritime transport. This fact underlines the importance of maritime 
transport. As in other industries, the maritime industry relies heavily on 
Information Communication and Technology (ICT) in order to enhance its 
operational efficiency. It is used to enable almost all essential maritime operations, 
whether during the sea leg or land leg of cargo transportation. Disruption or 
deniability of these ICT capabilities might have disastrous consequences for the 
service providers as well as cargo interests. As such the need to ensure dependability 
and enhance the robustness of systems to withstand cyber-attacks is a key challenge 
to all concerned.  
 
Prima facie analysis of the cyber security in the maritime sector highlights the policy 
context at an international level which emphasizes the low awareness of cyber 
security challenges in the maritime sector. Considering the lack of awareness and 
focus on cyber security leads to a low sense-of-urgency, this results in inadequate 
preparedness while facing cyber threats. As such, the effects of a potential cyber 
attack could cause considerable damage. 
 
Hence all sovereign governments need to consider developing and implementing 
awareness raising campaigns and imparting specialized training. Such awareness 
campaigns and training initiatives should be coordinated by relevant cyber security 
organizations. It would also be appropriate to point out that though the government 
should develop relevant policies and coordinate implementation, it should be left to 
highly trained professionals and respective experts to conduct the highly complex 
training programs. Thus it would be beneficial for all stakeholders to consensually 
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develop a strategy to tackle cyber threats. This is because current maritime 
regulations focus on physical aspects of security while ignoring the non-tangible 
cyber risks. 
 
One can begin by conducting an objective audit and assessment of existing cyber 
risks and then proactively applying sound security risk management principles to 
develop specific policies. The individual nation state governments should also 
consider aligning and harmonizing their domestic and international policies with 
regards to cyber security. There should also be proper coordination and cooperation 
between them, particularly by emphasizing better information exchange. 
 
Currently ICT systems deployed in maritime operations have become increasingly 
complex. In addition the rapid technology development and need to upgrade existing 
systems has reduced the focus on the security aspect of this issue. The vulnerabilities 
created by these security gaps may corrupt the invaluable databases. Furthermore, it 
was noticed that there was inadequate standardization of good cyber security 
practices thus causing incompatibility and delays.  
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A telling example is the increasing usage of ICT systems for cargo tracking and cargo 
identification which are facing increasing incidents of cyber attacks or system 
failures. The automated systems handling the cargo in ports are also highly 
vulnerable to data theft or manipulation for criminal purposes. Such incidents are 
bound to increase in the near future as a direct result of insufficient cyber security 
measures. 
 
This is despite the presence of various global l organizations such as IMO, WCO and 
the IMB, which is a specialized division of the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC). It is the lack of coordination between these stakeholders and stakeholders at 
other levels hinders them from playing the desired role. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the current regulatory context there is very little consideration given to cyber 
security threats. Most security related regulation such as the ISPS code only covers 
threats relating to physical infrastructure. This also implies a greater dependency on 
stakeholders to identify such threats and take corrective action. In such 
circumstances the stakeholders may face inordinate difficulties while addressing 
such cyber attacks as they are not competent enough to do so in the first place. To 
summarize it can be said that no holistic approach to tackle maritime cyber risks 
exists. This is despite some national governments attempting to minimize the threats 
in a rather ad hoc manner.  
 
Finally it should also be stated that the key stakeholders also lack the necessary 
incentives to improve their overall cyber security posture. It appears that we are 
waiting with bated breath for the next astounding „incident‟ to happen. 
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